Drowning together in dollars 
          
         SCMP March 1
          
          
          Last year, foreigners bought a net US$700 billion of American assets, 
          mostly government, agency and corporate debt. Is this not utter folly? 
          When, I ask, do they expect to get their money back?
         The players in the international money game mostly seem to believe 
          that this is a "pass the parcel" where the music never actually 
          stops. Or, if is does, it is because of one-off commercial accidents, 
          which leave only a limited number of participants holding the likes 
          of Enron debt. 
        
          What is not being asked is whether the galloping buildup of US debt 
          is going to cripple the whole system; the dollar-based world which has 
          existed since America unilaterally trashed the Bretton Woods agreement 
          in 1971. 
         
          History should teach us to be wary of central bankers as well as governments. 
          Yet the horizons of those who make the bulk of portfolio management 
          decisions, be they investment banks, monetary authorities or fund managers, 
          seldom look beyond 30 weeks, let alone 30 months. As for 30 years, forget 
          it. 
        But given the state of payment imbalances, any sensible discussion 
          of the future needs to start with a look backwards to at least 30 years 
          ago. It should include an understanding of the psychology of the deeply 
          indebted. 
        America's net debt to the rest of the world is approaching US$2 trillion. 
          The buildup has been apparently cheap and painless because of the dominant 
          role of the dollar in the global system. But the persistence of gigantic 
          deficits is not just raising the question of how long and at what price 
          this can be financed. It is beginning to cast a shadow over the whole 
          system, which hinges on confidence in the ability of the US to meet 
          its obligations. It looks increasingly unlikely that it can do so, even 
          assuming that either a major US recession or drastic Asian currency 
          revaluations come soon enough to halt the debt buildup. 
        Two groups of people are responsible for the impending crisis in international 
          finance, which could prove at least as damaging as that of 1971. First, 
          there is Federal Reserve chairman Alan Greenspan and the ranks of media 
          and political courtiers who surround him. His response to every problem 
          has been ever easier monetary conditions. It was his response to the 
          supposed Millennium bug, the collapse of the Nasdaq in 2000, the failure 
          of the Wall Street insiders' scam know as long-term credit management, 
          September 11, Enron and the mini-recession of 2002, for example. 
        Easy money naturally leads to debt buildups and bubbles as households 
          are positively encouraged to go out and buy petrol-guzzling sports utility 
          vehicles with 0 per cent finance, or extract equity from their inflated 
          house prices. Meanwhile, President George W. Bush is borrowing hundreds 
          of billions of dollars from the next generation to buy votes and illusions 
          of national security. The other group consists of those who allow this 
          process to continue, the mostly Asian central banks who buy all this 
          debt and the US investment banks with a huge vested interest in selling 
          mountains of dubious debt, and related instruments, to gullible foreigners. 
          Those foolish enough to believe that US government debt is really that 
          safe should examine the record. Foreign investors who believed in the 
          word of the State of Mississippi are still waiting for the redemption 
          of an issue made in 1833. 
        All right, so that was a state matter not a federal one and preceded 
          the civil war. But fast forward to the 1930s, when president Franklin 
          D. Roosevelt was searching for ways out of the depression. He not only 
          devalued the dollar and took the US off the gold standard, but repudiated 
          all contracts, public or private, which were denominated in gold. 
        Again, in 1971, president Richard Nixon ended the Bretton Woods system 
          by stopping the exchangeability of dollars into gold. Gold was becoming 
          attractive simply because of lack of faith in a US which was printing 
          money to finance war and a prosperous peace. The net result was a decade 
          or more of high inflation. 
        I am not suggesting that high inflation will return. But one must assume 
          either a period of artificially low interest rates to enable households 
          and the US government to manage its debt at the expense of the foreign 
          suckers who bought it. Or there is going to be an upsurge in US protectionism 
          as the great promoters of free trade and globalisation find it is not 
          working out as planned. The success of John Edwards' campaign for the 
          Democratic nomination shows the way the wind is blowing. Republicans 
          may in principle be more free-trade oriented, but it is hard to imagine 
          the Bush administration, with its contempt for foreign views, defending 
          free trade. 
        The third possibility is that there will be some form of dollar crisis 
          which will lead the US to freeze the dollar balances held by foreign 
          central banks, and even private institutions. Perhaps they would continue 
          to earn interest, but the principal would be subject to controls on 
          how and when it could be spent. The world needs the dollar as it premier 
          trading currency. It cannot be replaced, except over many years. But 
          it is possible to imagine a two tier-exchange system which separated 
          the dollar's trading role from that of the disastrous state of the US 
          foreign asset-liability balance. 
        Some Hongkongers may remember the problems caused by its membership 
          of the sterling area when Britain's own overseas position became too 
          weak to sustain its reserve currency role. Hong Kong kept its fiscal 
          reserves in sterling but following the devaluation in 1967 had to be 
          offered guarantees to ensure it did not switch to dollars, further draining 
          London's reserves. 
        The dollar problem is different. There is no alternative to the dollar. 
          But the size of the US foreign-debt overhang relative to the economy 
          is vastly greater than it was for Britain. 
        The crisis may be avoided. But as long as Asian governments continue 
          to bury their heads, fail to look at the facts or history, they will 
          contribute to the demise of a system they claim to be supporting. They 
          are underwriting the Greenspan hubris and in the process leading US 
          households into deep water, and America itself into a debt position 
          which will have dire consequences for its own influence and for the 
          system over which it has presided. 
        ends
        
         
         
        
        
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