Deciding whether to go nuclear
 
Philip Bowring IHT
Friday, September 24, 2004
The view from Asia
 
SEOUL From this vantange point in northeast Asia, Western-backed efforts to halt the global spread of nuclear weapons appear as an unrealistic mix of idealism, ideology and hypocrisy, and destined to fail.
.
This is not to say that South Koreans or Japanese want such weapons to proliferate, least all into the hands of North Korea. But there is an acknowledgement that the spread of nuclear know-how means that actual possession will inevitably spread unless the countries with nuclear capability find good reasons not to exercise it.
.
Having nuclear weapons or not is a decision that is not necessarily permanent and will be little constrained by nuclear non-proliferation treaties or rules of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Perhaps the best defense against their spread is the rarity of circumstances in which they could be of military value. It is also more difficult to acquire reliable delivery means than the nuclear weapon itself.
.
Yet it seems likely that South Korean laboratory experiments with plutonium and uranium enrichment are the tip of a global iceberg. Countries that have the capability prepare themselves for the day when they might need to go public with such capability, whether as a military threat or for diplomatic purposes.
.
Clearly, it is not in South Korea?s interest to pursue this at the present time. Its avowed aim is the denuclearization of the peninsula. Any overt nuclear moves would collapse its arguments vis-à-vis the North, destroy its defense relationship with the United States, and alienate Japan.
.
But South Korea, like Japan, knows it has the scientific know-how, the industrial capability and the sources of fuel to go down the nuclear path should circumstances change. There are growing doubts about the long-term durability of U.S. commitments in northeast Asia at a time when China is becoming more assertive. In time this is likely to erase even Japan's aversion to nuclear weapons. Likewise, failure to halt the North Korean program could eventually compel the South to respond.
.
As it is, North Korea is probably already very close to possessing a device. Testing it would show up the hollowness of nonproliferation for all to see. However, a demonstration explosion would also undermine Pyongyang's ability to use its nuclear program as a bargaining chip - money and security guarantees in return for not going nuclear.
.
For Pyongyang, as for Israel, it may be best not to actually detonate a device and thus to preserve the benefits of ambiguity.
.
Indeed, it seems likely that Iran is currently going down this road, acquiring the potential in terms of fuel and technology but leaving sufficient ambiguity to play with the West.
.
In this region, where only China has the bomb and others rely on the U.S. umbrella, there appears to be a measure of sympathy for Iran given its central position in a volatile region, with no big-power umbrella and with two immediate (Russia and Pakistan) and two near (India and Israel) neighbors with nuclear weapons.
.
In Asia generally there is a sense that nations have the right to make their own decisions, and not to be bullied by a West that proclaims the doctrine of nonproliferation but turns a blind eye to Israel and makes only token resistance to Pakistan joining the nuclear club.
.
Obviously, nuclear proliferation is undesirable. The more countries possess nuclear weapons, the greater the chance they will be used. But given the reality of the spread of technical know-how and the selective nature of Western-led attempts at non-proliferation, a new approach is needed.
.
That must focus on addressing the situations that make acquisition seem desirable and creating more conditions such as those that have enabled countries such as Brazil and South Africa to renounce the weapons.
.
The need to keep nuclear materials out of nonstate hands would also be better served by less hypocritical attitudes that would acknowledge the realities of nuclear ownership and thus enable better controls.



  E-mail This Article Print Article Text Larger Text Small Single Column Multi Column